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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                            
_____________ 
 
No. 13-1634 
_____________ 
 
ACRA TURF CLUB, LLC, A New Jersey Limited Liability Company;  
FREEHOLD RACEWAY OFF TRACK, LLC, A New Jersey Limited Liability 
Company 
 
v. 
 
FRANCESCO ZANZUCCKI, Executive Director of the New Jersey Racing 
Commission 
 
*NEW JERSEY THOROUGHBRED HORSEMEN’S ASSOCIATION, INC., 
    Appellant 
 
*(Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 12(a)). 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
District Court No. 3-12-cv-02775 
District Judge: The Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 10, 2014 
 
Before: SMITH, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 31, 2014) 
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________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM  
The New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association, Inc. (“NJTHA”) 
appeals the denial of its motion to intervene in this federal action. For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm. 
ACRA Turf Club, LLC (“ACRA”) and Freehold Raceway Off Track, LLC 
(“Freehold”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1983 and 1988, against Francesco Zanzuccki (“Zanzuccki”), Executive Director of 
the New Jersey Racing Commission (the “Commission”), asserting that certain 
amendments to New Jersey’s Off-Track and Account Wagering Act violate their 
rights under the United States Constitution.
1
 On July 27, 2012, NJTHA filed a 
motion to intervene in Plaintiffs’ federal suit and to dismiss the complaint.2 The 
Magistrate Judge struck as premature the part of the motion that sought to dismiss 
the Complaint, and NJTHA filed an appeal of that order, which we dismissed for 
                                                 
1
  The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ case on Younger abstention grounds, 
and Plaintiffs filed an appeal, which was docketed as No. 13-3064, and 
consolidated with this appeal for disposition only. We resolve that appeal in a 
separate opinion issued concurrently with this one. Because most of the facts and 
procedural history are set out in that opinion, and because here we write principally 
for the parties, we recite only those facts essential to our disposition of this appeal. 
2
  On August 7, 2012, the Standardbred Breeders and Owners Association also 
filed a motion to intervene and to dismiss, but has not participated in this appeal. 
 3 
lack of jurisdiction. The District Court thereafter denied the motions to intervene, 
finding that the proposed intervenors failed to demonstrate that their interests were 
not adequately represented by Zanzuccki. NJTHA timely appealed.
3
 
We  “review a denial of a motion to intervene as of right for abuse of 
discretion, although this review is ‘more stringent’ than the abuse of discretion 
review we apply to a denial of a motion for permissive intervention.” Brody v. 
Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 
592, 597 (3d Cir. 1987)). When reviewing the denial of intervention as of right, we 
“will reverse a district court’s determination only if the court has applied an 
improper legal standard or reached a decision that we are confident is incorrect.” 
Mountain Top Condo. Ass’n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 
365 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). We are, however, “more 
reluctant to intrude into the highly discretionary decision of whether to grant 
permissive intervention.” Brody, 957 F.2d at 1115. The District Court denied 
NJTHA’s request to intervene as a party defendant as of right and for permissive 
intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. 
 Rule 24(a) intervention as of right covers any proposed intervenor who, by 
timely motion, “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the 
subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a 
                                                 
3
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We 
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. 
 4 
practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless 
existing parties adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Thus, 
an applicant may intervene as of right if: 
(1) the application for intervention is timely; (2) the applicant has a 
sufficient interest in the litigation; (3) the interest may be affected or 
impaired, as a practical matter by the disposition of the action; and (4) 
the interest is not adequately represented by an existing party in the 
litigation. 
 
Harris, 820 F.2d at 596. In denying the motion, the District Court concluded that 
the fourth prong was not met because NJTHA’s interest was adequately 
represented by the New Jersey Attorney General as counsel for Zanzuccki. 
 We agree. The Attorney General is charged with defending the 
constitutionality of state statutes, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:17A-4, and there is no 
indication here that the Attorney General, as representative of the Commission, has 
not actively fulfilled his statutory role and vigorously defended the Amendments. 
In this situation, “a presumption of adequate representation generally arises when 
the representative is a governmental body or officer charged by law with 
representing the interests of the absentee.” Commonwealth of Pa. v. Rizzo, 530 
F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 1976). Moreover, NJTHA and the Commission here have 
aligned interests: they both want the Amendments to be upheld and the off track 
 5 
wagering programs to succeed.
4
 Therefore, the District Court applied the correct 
legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in denying NJTHA’s Rule 24 motion 
to intervene as of right. 
 We turn next to the claim that the District Court abused its discretion by not 
allowing permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). Permissive intervention is 
available upon timely motion when the movant “has a claim or defense that shares 
with the main action a common question of law or fact,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
24(b)(1)(B), and the intervention will not unduly delay the proceedings or 
prejudice the original parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). In denying permissive 
intervention, the District Court relied in part on the fact that the interests of 
NJTHA were already adequately represented and that its interjection of unrelated 
new claims would delay the proceedings. The District Court had good reason to 
deny permissive intervention. “[W]here, as here, the interests of the applicant in 
every manner match those of an existing party and the party’s representation is 
deemed adequate, the district court is well within its discretion in deciding that the 
applicant’s contributions to the proceedings would be superfluous and that any 
                                                 
4
  For this reason, NJTHA’s reliance on Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Service, 157 
F.3d 964 (3d Cir. 1998), is misplaced. In Kleissler, the proposed intervenor was a 
private entity with an interest in the logging industry. In that case, the presumption 
of adequate representation was overcome “when an agency’s views are necessarily 
colored by its view of the public welfare rather than the more parochial views of a 
proposed intervenor whose interest is personal to it.” Id. at 972. Here, both the 
Commission and NJTHA are interested in defending the Amendments and 
allowing off track wagering to grow.     
 6 
resulting delay would be ‘undue.’” Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pa., 672 F.2d 1133, 
1136 (3d Cir. 1982). The District Court appropriately exercised its discretion when 
it concluded that the proposed intervenor’s interests are aligned with those of the 
Attorney General and its unrelated claims would delay the proceeding. 
 Finally, we turn to NJTHA’s argument that the District Court misapplied the 
indispensible party doctrine by not allowing NJTHA to be joined under Rule 19(a). 
Without deciding whether or not it is procedurally proper for a non-party to move 
for joinder under Rule 19, we agree with the District Court that a movant who may 
meet the joinder requirements of Rule 19 does not automatically qualify to 
intervene as of right, as “[t]hat interpretation would read the ‘adequacy of 
representation’ requirement out of Rule 24(a)(2) by creating a backdoor into the 
litigation through the less restrictive inquiry of Rule 19(a)(2)(I).” Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d 216, 230 (3d Cir. 2005). Thus, the District Court 
properly found that NJTHA’s Rule 19 argument did not provide a basis for 
intervention. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the denial of the motion to 
intervene.   
 
